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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN MICHAEL SHANE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah

State Prison,

)
)

)

Case No.

12905

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, John Michael Shane, appeals from a
decision of the Third Judicial District Court, denying his
release from the Utah State Prison upon a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On April 3, 1972, John Michael Shane filed a petition
seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging that his commitment to the Utah State Prison was invalid. The matter
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came on for hearing on April 18, 1972, before the Honor.
able Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, who denied the petition
on April 25, 1972.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, John W. Turner, requests that the judg.
ment and order of the Court below be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees basically with the facts as stated
by appellant with the following additions and clarifica.
tions: The transcript of the entry of the plea also reflects a dialogue between appellant and the comt con·
cerning the appellant's right to counsel in which the appeJ.
lant indicated that he would handle his own case and tha!
he had "three and one half years of law school at UCLA''
and that he had represented himself before (Exhibit 1-D,
p. 3). At the habeas corpus hearing the appellant indicated that he had not been in law school at UCLA ano
that he had never attended a college class there (R. 40).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS BECAUSE THE APPELLANT
EFFECTIVELY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
APPOINTED COUNSEL.
To separate the truly indigent from those who rnigbt
. the court's power to appom
· t counsel a
seek to expl01t
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defei:Jant is requfred to com.plete under oath an affidavit
revealing his financial status. There is no requirement
that the defendant be told of the purpose of the inquiry,
and such disclosure would invite perjury by those who
did not wish to use their own resources to hire counsel.
Appellant testified that he falsified his financial affidavit (Exhibit 2) for the purpose of deceiving the court
into granting him a lighter sentence (R. 36, 44). In this
appeal appellant seeks to fault the court for the dismissal
of his appointed counsel and would have this court sanction his fraudulent behavior in the matter. When questioned by the court at his arraignment about the facts
surrounding his attorney's dismissal, appellant perjured
himself by saying that his attorney requested dismissal
because of "conflict of interest" (Exhibit 1-D, p. 3).
Appellant claims that he was effectively denied his
right to counsel thereafter because he did not knowingly
and intelligently waive this right. Appellant relies on
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed.
2d 70 (1962) to substantiate his point. In that case as
Eoted by the court at p. 513:
"The record does not show that the trial judge
offered and the petitioner declined counsel."
This Court does not have so empty a record. Appellant was told initially that he had a right to have an attorney (Exhibit 1-D, p. 2), and that if he were unable
to employ one the court would "help to see that you have
one" (Exhibit 1-D, p. 2). Appellant the answered "No,
Sir," to the question: "Do you want the court to help you
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find a lawyer?" (Exhibit 1-D, p. 3). Appellant perjured
himself again about having had three and one half yearo
of law school at UCLA (Exhibit 1-D, p. 3; R. 40) and also
about having represented himself before (Exhibit 1-D, p.
3), and the court then reiterated to him something it was
led to believe he already knew - that there are addi.
tional problems to be encountered by one representing
himself (Exhibit 1-D, p. 3). Finally, before accepting
appellant's plea of guilty, the court asked once again.
" ... do you want to talk to a lawyer or anybody?" (Ex·
hibit 1-D, p. 4). Clearly this is not a silent record which
falls within the purview of Carnley, supra, since a detailed
record discloses that appellant knowingly waived his right
to appointed counsel.

In the case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 485, 5S
S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed 1461 (1937), the United States Su·
preme Court stated the test for determining whether a
defendant has intelligently waived his right to counsel.
There the court said:
"The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must de·
pend in each case, upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the ac·
cused." 82 L. Ed. 1461 at 1466.
There have been no stricter guidelines subsequently
introduced, and it is clear that discretion is left t.o the
particular court. Here, appellant established his own back·
ground and experience, and his conduct was made t.o appear as that of one who was comfortable in the courtroom
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environment and knowledgeable of the law. The Court
had no reason to believe appellant's background to have
been different from the description given by appellant
himself.
Having deliberately misled the Court as to both his
eligibility to be represented by appointed counsel and his
capacity to understand the significance of the proceedings
and to represent himself thereat, appellant may not now
be heard to complain of the outcome precipimted by his
01'.'11 fraud upon the court. Appellant's actions constituted
a !mowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.
POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
The petitioner relies on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.
S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), as holding
that all constitutional rights must be individually described and explained before an accused may waive any
of them. Respondent contends that this is not required
to waive constitutional rights. The only federal court to
rule on this particular point since the decision in Boykin,
supra, has been the Fifth Circuit in a similar case decided
just seven days prior to appellant's arraignment. In
United States v. Frontera, 452 F. 2d 406 (1971), the defendant was informed that his plea constituted a waiver

of his right to a jury trial. He too argued that this wa'
insufficient and that he should have been informed tha(
his plea constituted a waiver of his right to confront llli
C'.ccusers and his privilege against compulsory self··tn·
crimination. On this point the court held:
"This court is, however, aware of no precedent,
from the Supreme Court or elsewhere, for the
preposition that due process requires that a def2::.
dant be informed of each and every right whicn
is waived by a guilty plea or that the waiver ol
these
is a "consequence" \vithin the
of Rule 11, of which a defendant must be petc;o;;
ally illiormed before a guilty plea may be accepted
Carrying Kelly's argument to its logical conclusion.
the court, before accepting a guilty plea, would be
required to inform a defendant of his right to a
speedy and public trial, his right to an impartial
jury, his right to compulsory process fot obwinini
witnesses, his right to be free from cruel and un·
usual punishment, his right to be free from un·
reasonable searches and seizures, his right to have
excluded from the trial any evidence illegall)
seized, and many more. We do not read Rule 11
as requiring this; nor do we feel that due proces>
requires this." 452 F. 2d at 415.
Neither Boykin, supra, nor any other case has set
out a specific dialogue to be used in making the accusea
aware of these rights. The cases do insist, however, thal
the accused know what he is doing when he pleads guilcy
and that the plea be voluntary and intelligent. In decid·
ing whether a plea be voluntary, it is proper to consider
all the circlli'TIStances involved. In Brady v. United Statei.
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397 U. S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970), the
Si;preme Court clarified Boykin when it stated:
"The voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all the relevant circumstances surrounding it." 397 U. S. at 749.
The surrounding circumstances can be substantiated
in the instant case because, unlike Boykin, supra, the
record here is not "silent". The court in Boykin, supra,
was referring to the fact that there was nothing recorded
concerning the dialogue between the accused and the
brnch aside from the comment that the accused "plead
guilty." 395 U. S. at 246, fn. 1.
Two weeks after appellant's arraignment, the Supreme Court in ruling on a similar matter in Santobello
v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct.
495 (1971), clarified what it meant by "insuring that the
record was not silent."
"Rule 11. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
governing pleas in federal courts now makes it
clear that the sentencing judge must develop, on
the record, the factual basis for the plea; as, for
example, by having the accused describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge." 30 L. Ed. 2d
at 432.
This need was anticipated by the court below (Exhibit
1-D, p. 4). Rule 11 further states that the court must
address the accused personally (see Exhibit 1-D); insure
that the accused understands the nature of the charge
(Exhibit 1-D, p. 7) and the consequences of the plea
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(Exhibit 1-D, p. 7-8) fully did.

all of which the trial court care.

Appellant alleges he \vas told by a special
for the Weber County Sheriff's Department that by wafr.
ing preliminary examination, preliminary hearing, ano
entering a plea of guilty, he would get probation (R. 31)
While waiving his preliminary hearing, appellant wm
made to understand that there were no promises that hi;
waiver would help him in the District Court (R. 24)
After being told by the court, in essence, that the counsrl
he received from Sgt. Bowman, the special investigator
could not guarantee him any benefit in the District Court
he now contends that Sgt. Bowman's opinion about i
pleading was sufficient coercion to make his plea of guilfy
involuntary. The trial judge, in the habeas corpus hearini
below was in the position to evaluate the credibility ol
the appellant as he testified in his own behalf. Given tni
appellant's reluctant admission that he had perjured him
self on prior occasions, the judge was not obligated to re
lieve his assertions of coercion of plea.
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Jackson,
390 U. S. 570, 20 L. Ed. 2d 138, 88 S. Ct. 1209 (1968), tliat
a guilty plea is not compelled and invalid under the
Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's
sire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser pen
alty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extena
ing from acquittal to conviction and a higher
authorized by law for the crime charged. Here, appel
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lant's chances of a reduced sentence could not even have
been considered a probability.
In Barber v. Gwdden, 327 F. 2d 101, cert. den., 377
U. S. 971, 12 L. Ed. 2d 741, 84 S. Ct. 1654 {1964), the
court stated:

"A plea motivated by a desire to avoid a more
stringent punishment is not involuntary if it is a
well-considered, prudent choice of the lesser of two
evils." 327 F. 2d at 104.
If there were any ambiguity in the record concerning
the efforts of the Weber County District Court to apprise
appellant of his rights, it was not because of the court's
negligence. The judge patiently persisted despite the constant "I'm well aware of that" (Exhibit 1-D, p. 4) responses he received from the appellant as he impersonated
one who had received three and one-half years of formal
legal training and had defended himself before.

The evidence taken below supports the trial judge's
finding that appellant knowingly and intelligently pied
guilty to the crime charged, and that finding ought to be
upheld on review absent an abuse of discretion, which
appellant has not shown.
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CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that the appellant knowingly
and intelligently both waived his right to appointed coun.
sel and entered his plea of guilty.
For the reasons and analysis above stated, this appeal
should be denied and the judgment and order of the court
below should be affinned.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. IRVINE
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

